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ABSTRACT
Adopting a gender-aware perspective, this paper investigates the controversial relationship of
inequality and growth studying the effects of income disparity on the differences between male and
female schooling in the presence of liquidity constraints and inefficient financial markets. In
cultural contexts where male education is considered more profitable, financial markets’
inefficiency has biased effects on human capital accumulation; given the significant contribution of
women’s education to economic prosperity, a theoretical model and a panel data analysis of sixty
three countries for six five years periods from 1965 to 1994 show a negative impact of income
inequality on economic growth through the disincentives to invest in female schooling. A financial
markets’ reform to improve efficiency and increase available liquidity could offer an important
contribution to the closure of the gender educational gap.
KEYWORDS
Poverty feminization, intra-household allocation, educational gender gap, income inequality,
economic growth, credit markets’ imperfections.
                                                
1 Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT.
  E-mail: c.binelli@ucl.ac.uk2
EDUCATIONAL GENDER GAP, INEQUALITY AND GROWTH:
A GENDER SENSITIVE ANALYSIS
                                            Chiara Binelli, University College London
         October 20033
1. INTRODUCTION
Of the world six billion people, one fifth suffers from a condition of extreme poverty, living on
less than one dollar per day. Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, which does not identify a
static condition, but rather a process where the assets that an individual owns or is able to acquire
have a critical importance; inadequate access to basic economic resources, poor educational and
health services combine with significant difficulties or nearly impossibility to take part to the social
and political activities of a community.
In their analysis of developing countries, Michael Lipton and Martin Ravaillon (1995) have
summarized the peculiar features of chronic poverty; together with high fertility and infant
mortality rates, poverty hits women more than men. Female poverty presents distinctive traits and
degrees of manifestation and it is related to the extent of gender inequality that varies among
societies, shaped to a considerable extent by kinship rules; customary gender norms and values can
lead to political, legal, economic, and educational inequalities that perpetuate women’s lack of
access to resources, control over decision making, and participation in public life. Poor women face
a double disadvantage in access to resources and voice: they are poor, and they are women (World
Development Report 2000/2001). Legal systems can constrain women from becoming independent
economic actors; in most developing countries family laws are stacked against women, restricting
their rights in divorce and inheritance of land and other productive resources. In many countries
women continue to be denied basic legal rights; in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
married women, according to both customary and common law, are under the permanent
guardianship of their husbands and have no independent right to manage property; in Guatemala
men have the right to restrict the kind of employment their wives can accept outside the house.
The available data confirm a wide diffusion of poverty feminization; according to the most
recent estimates, women represent seventy percent of the world poor and the proportion of female
population that lives in rural areas in conditions of extreme poverty has increased by fifty percent in
the last twenty years (United Nations Fund for Women, 2000). Female differs from male poverty4
because of the expectations regarding behaviors, rights and access to productive resources that are
associated to gender biased social norms. Two features, in particular, characterize female poverty:
-  poverty hits women more often and for a longer time than men;
-  female poverty shows very high degrees of intensity and it is often chronic.
One peculiar feature that identifies women’s poverty is the lack of access to schooling; a significant
gender educational gap characterizes most developing countries. According to the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’ statistics, in the year two thousands women
represent two thirds of the eight hundred seventy six millions of the world illiterate; in the same
year, eighty-eight millions of children did not attend school; among them, three over five are female
(UNESCO 2000). As shown in table 1 in Appendix A2, in all macro regions, with the exception of
Southern Africa, there is a significant gender gap in illiteracy rate. Table 2 presents summary
statistics from the United Nations database ( The World’s Women 2000. Trends and Statistics,
United Nations Headquarters, New York); considering the population aged 15-24, in twenty-one
countries for which data are available, more than one women over four is illiterate. Africa as a
whole, with the exception of South Africa, shows the widest gender gap in literacy rate, with over
forty percent of the illiterate being female. Together with gender differences in illiteracy rate, there
exists a significant educational gender gap at the primary and secondary level. Table 3 in Appendix
A2 presents gross enrollment ratios classified by gender; in all thirty-one countries under
consideration the ratio of female to male students is less than four to five.
Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2000) have computed the ratio of female and male enrollment
rate for forty years between 1960 and 2000 for more than one hundred countries. Table 4 in
Appendix A2 has been obtained using the regional categorization of the two authors. As the data
show, in the 1990s there has been a significant improvement in the gender educational gap;
considering the developing countries as a whole, the ratio between female and male enrollment rate
has increased from sixty three percent in 1990 to sixty seven percent in 1995 for the population
aged twenty five or more and from sixty nine to seventy two percent for the population aged fifteen5
or more. However, confirming the trend of the past decades, the gender educational gap is still
significant in Africa and South Asia with respect to South America and East Europe and to the rich
countries in Western Europe, North America and New Zealand, where the difference between
female and male schooling has almost disappeared; moreover, considering the overall sample made
up of one hundred and seven countries, the average ratio of female to male secondary education is
still below ninety percent.
Women’s poor education has a strong negative impact for next generations’ well being, since
the burden of bearing and rearing children falls largely on mothers. Different authors have
underlined the positive spillover effects of female education; on the one hand, many empirical
studies have shown a negative correlation between mothers’ educational level and fertility or infant
mortality rate (e.g. Anne Hill and Elizabeth King 1995, Kalanidhi Subbarao and Laura Raney
1995). On the other, several econometric analysis have investigated the link between gender
equality in resources’ allocation, education and the growth rate of per capita gross domestic
product; David Dollar and Roberta Gatti (1999) have shown that a more equitable distribution of
resources between men and women leads to higher rates of per capita income growth; Stephan
Klasen (1999) has performed cross country regressions that indicate how countries which invest
more in girls’ education have higher rates of economic growth.
Together with the analysis of the benefits produced by higher rates of female schooling,
empirical research has focused on the factors that lead to under investment in women’s education.
Dollar and Gatti (1999) have emphasized the role of legal rights, political freedom and religion
affiliation; countries that invest poorly in women education are characterized by social and cultural
backwardness that limit their growth potential; moreover, they have found that more gender
equality is associated with higher levels of family income. The analysis of Deon Filmer (1999)
confirms the existence of a correlation between availability of economic resources and investment
in female education: a wider educational gender gap characterizes the poorest countries with respect
to the ones with a higher average per capita income.6
Poverty feminization and gender differences in enrollment and attendance rates require an
accurate analysis in order to understand the mechanisms that justify the preference towards male
education. In particular, given the role of available wealth as a factor that influences educational
choices, it is important to study the relationship between income distribution and human capital
investment decisions. Oded Galor and Joseph Zeira (1993) were the first to underline the impact of
resources’ availability on human capital formation; in their model, in the presence of credit
markets’ imperfections, income inequality influences the growth process through investment in
education. Inefficient financial markets make it difficult to obtain credits from banks that request
high interest rates and significant collaterals as repayment guarantees; in the absence of government
interventions and income subsidies, the lack of economic resources constraints the opportunity of
human capital investments. Therefore, income inequality can have a negative impact on economic
growth if most of the population is unable to finance educational expenses.
The literature that has analyzed investment in education and the relationship between inequality
and growth has traditionally adopted a gender-neutral approach, considering the impact of
resources’ availability on an average measure of educational attainment; this approach appears to be
both unsatisfactory and inconclusive. Given the significant spillover effects of female education and
the persistent gender differences in the enrollment rate at the primary and secondary level, it is
important to evaluate the impact of income inequality on the gender gap in education and not on the
mean educational level. Customary gender norms influence investment decisions and credit
markets’ imperfections operate in a cultural and economic environment where male is considered
more profitable than female education; as a consequence, inefficient financial markets penalize
women’s more than men’s human capital accumulation.
Adopting a gender-aware perspective, this paper investigates the controversial relationship
between inequality and growth studying the effects of income disparities on the differences between
male and female schooling, in the presence of liquidity constraints and inefficiency of the financial
markets. The gender sensitive approach that is developed is novel and offers two important7
contributions. First of all, it helps identifying credit markets’ imperfections as a new factor that
determines the educational gender gap; moreover, it is able to suggest a new possible explanation of
the relationship between inequality and growth.
Building on the model of liquidity constraints proposed by Galor and Zeira (1993) and on the
one by Ashish Garg and Jonathan Morduch (1998) on the influence of cultural and social factors on
parents’ investment choices, the paper develops an analytical framework that considers the impact
of income inequality and spare resources on the gender gap in education; given the role of social
norms that favor male education, the analysis considers human capital investment decisions both in
the presence of credit markets’ imperfections and in the context of financial market efficiency. The
gender-sensitive model serves as a basis for the econometric testing of the effects of income
inequality on economic growth via the educational gender gap.
The empirical analysis uses a methodology suggested by Roberto Perotti (1994), that has
synthesized the main implications it is necessary to test in order to evaluate the role of credit
markets’ imperfections in the relationship between inequality and growth. The construction of a
wide panel data sample made up of sixty-three countries with observations for six five-yearly
periods between 1965 and 1994 and the use of fixed and random effects improve estimates’
efficiency and lower the risk of biased estimates. The empirical results that will be presented offer
plain support to the hypothesis of increasing under investment in female with respect to male
education in the presence of high-income inequality and credit markets’ imperfections. Given the
positive effects of women’s education on economic growth, the results show the existence of a
negative impact of income inequality on growth through the disincentives to invest in female
schooling.8
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical model developed in t his paper evaluates the relationship between income
inequality and human capital investment building on the seminal contribution of Galor and Zeira
(1993, GZ thereafter); however, it introduces two important innovations with respect to the gender-
neutral framework of GZ. First of all, since credit markets’ imperfections operate in a social and
economic context where gender biased social norms and widespread gender wage gap favor
investment in male education, the analysis focuses on the impact of income inequality on the
educational gender gap and not on a gender-neutral measure of average educational attainment.
Moreover, Galor and Zeira’s model considers the behavior of an individual that chooses between
education and work; on the contrary, given the importance of family background and the significant
path dependence that characterizes investment in education, the model that will be developed
analyzes the factors that influence parents’ decision to finance children’s education, rather than the
choice of a self-financing individual.
Secondly, theoretical analysis evaluates the influence of customs and traditions that promote a
gender-biased impact of credit markets’ imperfections. The presence of social and cultural factors
that favor male education requires an analysis of investments in education even in the context of
efficient financial markets; the model that will be presented will adopt the simple analytical
structure developed by Garg and Morduch (1998) for the analysis of the factors that influence
financing decisions of health care expenses by the parents in favor of the children.
In order to develop an empirically testable theoretical framework, the analysis will focus on the
short run effects of credit markets’ imperfections; the last section will propose the graphical
representation used by Galor and Zeira’s model to describe the evolution of the economic system in
the long run.9
2.1 The analytical structure
Let us consider a family composed by four individuals: one couple of parents and two children,
one male and one female. For simplicity, let us assume that the husband and the wife share the same
utility function that depends on their own and their children’s well-being. Formally, for both of the
parents the following relationship holds:
( ) b c u log * 1 log * a a - + =           (1)
where u represents the utility level of each adult, c is the consumption level that is used as a proxy
of the individual’s well-being,  b is the bequest that the parent leaves to the children and  a  is a
parameter with values ranging between zero and one, measuring the degree of parental altruism.
CASE 1: Investment in education in the presence of credit markets’ efficiency
Let us assume that the rate of return of financing E years of education of the son is given by
the following function:
  ( ) E R R m m =
Symmetrically, the rate of return of a female human capital investment is given by:
( ) E R R f f =
Let us assume that both of the functions are concave and characterized by decreasing rates of
returns; thus,  f m i R R i i , 0 , 0
' ' ' = < > .10
Gender biased labor markets and gender wage gap, customs and traditions as the practice of
dowry, widespread in several low income countries, favor male education that is considered more
profitable by the parents; in order to capture the preference towards male education, we assume that
( ) ( ) i f i m E R E R >  for any i additional year of schooling; assuming that male and female returns to
education show a similar trend, it follows that the male curve is always above the female one
2.
The decision to finance children’s human capital is based on a comparison between expected
future benefits and actual costs. For the moment, let us assume that capital is perfectly mobile and
individuals have free access to credits’ markets. Borrowers and lenders face the same interest rate r
> 0, constant over time. Under the assumption that parents are rational agents that maximize the
utility function (1), the total number of schooling years financed for any child is obtained by
equating marginal costs and benefits of the investment:
( ) ( ) ( ) r H R H R m m f f + = = 1
' '            (2)
Having hypothesized that  ( ) ( ) i f i m E R E R >  for any  i E  and R ’> 0, R’’ < 0, the equilibrium level of
female education 
*
f E  is lower than the male one
*
m E . Therefore, the educational gender gap shows
up even in the absence of credit markets’ imperfections, because of gender wage gaps, customs and
traditions that lead to underestimate expected benefits associated to female schooling.
CASE 2: Investment in education in the presence of credit markets’ imperfections
In the presence of credit markets’ imperfections the borrowing interest rate is higher than the
one faced by the lenders. In particular, creditors can access funds at an interest rate r, while they
lend money at a rate  d i > r, in order to avoid significant losses due to moral hazard, since debtors
                                                
2 Alternatively, it is possible to assume that the curves’ shape is a function of the rate of return associated to different
levels of cumulated human capital (see Garg and Morduch, 1998); this modification does not change the results of the
model.11
can avoid payment deciding to leave the country or declaring not to be able to repay the loan. Let us
assume that, in order to prevent insolvency risk, the lenders decide to control borrowers’ behavior,
bearing a cost z. Creditors’ control reduces debtors’ incentives to avoid repayment; let us assume
that, in order to escape the creditor, the debtor has to bear a cost b*z, where b > 1. An agent that
borrows an amount of money d will have to pay an interest rate  d i  that is able to cover the rate r
and the cost z the creditor has to face in order to be able to lend the money.
As a consequence, in equilibrium, the following condition holds:
z r d i d d + * = * (3)
The lender will choose z trying to minimize the risk of borrowers’ default; thus, in equilibrium:
( ) z i d d * = + b 1 (4)
Considering the two equations system made by (3) and (4) and substituting in (3) the expression for
d, we have:
r
r
i id >
-
* +
= =
1
1
b
b
(5)
Equation (5) shows that the rate of interest on loans does not depend on the amount of money that
has been lent. This result can be justified under the hypothesis that monitoring costs faced by the
creditors are proportional to the amount of the loans; as the amounts increase, both the incentive to
avoid repayment and the costs to monitor debtors’ behaviors increase.12
2.2 Credit markets’ imperfections: short run effects
In the presence of credit markets’ imperfections, the decision to finance children’s education
depends on the expected rate of return and on the interest rate that the individual faces in the
financial markets. The costs to finance male and female education are different; in particular, let us
assume that the amount of money necessary to finance male education is equal to g, while an
investment in female education requires an income’s share h > g.
In order to analyze investments’ choices, let us distinguish among three different cases. First of
all, let us consider a household where the amount of available resources is smaller than g. Parents
have to apply for a loan in order to finance children’s schooling; if expected benefits do not
outweigh actual costs, they can decide not to finance education. Alternatively, they can borrow in
the financial markets in order to pay for schooling expenses. Even if actual costs are higher, in the
presence of gender-biased labor markets and customary gender norms, investment in male
education can seem more profitable and the educational gender gap follows as a natural outcome of
a rational behavior. In a second scenario a rich family has access to an amount of funds bigger than
h; the parents will estimate the profitability of an investment in children’s education as if they were
facing efficient financial markets, since they are not subject to credits’ constraints.
The third possible case is characterized by a family that has an amount of resources x such
that h x g < £ . If the parents decide to invest in male education they do not need to borrow money
and the utility function becomes:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] r g x c x U m m + * - + = 1 log (6)
where  m c  and  m U  indicate respectively the consumption level and the parents’ utility level if they
decide to finance only male education.13
On the contrary, in order to invest in female education, it is necessary to access the financial
markets and the utility function becomes:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] i h x c x U f f + * - + = 1 log (7)
The decision to invest in female education is profitable if and only if ( ) ( ) x U x U m f ‡ , that is if and
only if the following condition is satisfied:
( ) ( )
( ) r i
r g i h c c
k x
f m
-
+ - + + -
= ‡
1 1
(8)
Due to the high borrowing interest rate, families that have an amount of resources that is smaller
than  k do not invest in female human capital. Given the important positive spillover effects of
female education, (8) shows the negative effects of low income in the presence of inefficient
financial markets. The model suggests the existence of a positive correlation between an increase in
family income and a decrease in the educational gender gap; however, in social and cultural
contexts characterized by a strong gender bias, improvements in households’ welfare can be unable
to promote a significant reduction of the educational gender gap.
2.3 Credit markets’ imperfections: long run effects
In the analysis of the short run, the presence of credit markets’ imperfections has been sufficient
to justify the impact of an unequal resources distribution on human capital investment and
economic growth. On the contrary, as underlined in the model developed by Galor and Zeira
(1993), in the long run it is necessary to make a second important assumption: the non convexity of
the human capital production technology. Under this assumption, it can be shown that stationary
equilibriums exist and they are characterized by different average educational and income levels; on14
the contrary, if the production technology is convex, income distribution converges to a unique long
run equilibrium where each family invests the same amount of resources to finance education
3.
Figure (1) below makes use of the graphical representation proposed by Galor and Zeira (1993) to
analyze the dynamic evolution of the wealth distribution, in the context of the model of educational
gender gap that has been developed in the previous sections.
                                  1 + t x
                                              xm           g      k   h           xf             t x                  Figure (1)
Families with a level of available resources smaller than g need to borrow money in the capital
markets in order to invest in education. Investment in female human capital is too expensive and
unprofitable; the long run education equilibrium level will be represented by  xm, with all the
resources invested in male education. Families with available resources between g and k can avoid
borrowing if they decide to invest only in male education. The high borrowing interest rates
significantly increase the financing costs; as a consequence, the long run equilibrium level is again
xm. Rich families with available wealth above k will finance both female and male education in
equilibrium; if the amount of resources is greater than h, they can avoid borrowing in the financial
market; if the level of wealth is between k and h, they need to borrow in the financial markets in
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contributions where the same long run equilibrium distribution is obtained starting from different initial distributional
settings, in the presence of a convex production technology.
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order to finance both male and female education. As in the short run, in the long run we expect a
negative correlation between educational gender gap and average household income.
The economic environment that has been described is characterized by two distinct categories of
families: rich households that decide to invest in both female and male education; poor families that
do not have enough resources to finance human capital accumulation or decide to invest exclusively
in male education. The setting is characterized by multiple long run equilibria and the final steady
state where the economy will converge will depend on the initial degree of income inequality; a
poor economy where the majority of the population has limited economic resources will be
characterized by a significant educational gender gap and a persistent underdevelopment. On the
contrary, a rich economy has enough resources to promote human capital investment and gender
equality in education; however, in the presence of high income inequality, the educational gender
gap will not be closed and the economic system will be characterized by an average wealth level
which is smaller than the equilibrium level that could have been reached in the presence of a more
equitable income distribution.
3. THE MODEL AND THE DATA
The model outlined in the previous section has analyzed the short and long run relationship
between income inequality and the gender educational gap, in the presence of customary gender
norms and credit markets’ imperfections that influence parents’ investment in children’s education.
In order to estimate the impact of income inequality on the educational gender gap in the context of
inefficient financial markets, we use the methodology proposed by Roberto Perotti (1994) that has
synthesized the main theoretical implications that can be tested in order to evaluate the role of credit
markets’ imperfections in the relationship between inequality and growth. In particular, three major
implications can be empirically tested:
1)  for a given degree of credit markets’ imperfections, less income inequality leads to higher
investment in education;16
2)  given an initial wealth distribution, more efficient financial markets lead to higher
investment rates;
3)  the importance of the wealth distribution as a factor that influences investment in education
decreases as financial markets become more efficient.
The above implications will be tested in a gender sensitive perspective, evaluating the effects
produced by credit markets’ imperfections on the amount invested in male with respect to
female education.
The empirical specification takes the following expression:
it i it it it it o it e INT PERF Gini gdppc Gap + + + + + + = a b b b b b 4 3 2 1 1 ln (9)
where i is the individual’s subscript and t the time subscript.  it gap  is the educational gender gap
at the beginning of period t; it is computed as the ratio between average years of male and
female secondary schooling.  it gdppc1 ln   is the logarithm of real per capita income at the
beginning of period t. it Gini  is the income inequality index; since complete time series of this
variable are not available for most of the countries in the dataset, for each period, the values of
the year that is closest to the first year of the period will be used. it PERF  represents a measure of
credit markets’ perfection; for this variable the values that refer to the first year of each period
will be used.  it INT  is the interaction term between Gini index and the variable of credit markets’
perfection.  i a  are the individual dummies that control for the influence of fixed time effects not
included in the set of independent variables;  it e  is the error term.
The data used to estimate equation (9) have been collected from different sources. Per capita
income values have been taken from the Global Development Network Growth Database of the
World Bank; the human capital variables come from Barro and Lee (2000) dataset that reports
the five years periods average secondary school for a male and female sample of individuals17
aged fifteen years or more. In order to be able to make use of reliable statistics and to extend the
sample to low and medium low income countries, the analysis will consider a thirty years
period, from 1965 to 1994; moreover, given the availability of human capital data, six five years
periods will be considered for each country. The values of the Gini index are taken from the
dataset developed by Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire (1996) on the basis of three criteria that
increase data’s reliability
4. First of all, the data come from microeconomic studies on the
families’ consumption and expenditure behavior; secondly, the sample has to be representative
of the entire country; finally, the measure of income or expenditure inequality considers all
sources of earnings. In order to increase the significance of the obtained results and to compare
them directly with previous analysis
5, the sample includes only the countries for which at least
two observations for the Gini index are available; a description of variables and data’s source
together with summary statistics are presented in Appendix A1.
In the dataset there are sixty three countries, four of which are from Central and East Africa,
five from Sub-Saharan Africa, sixteen from Latin America and the Caribbean, nine from East
Asia and five from South Asia; four are Eastern European Transition countries, twenty are
Western European and North American countries. Table 5 in Appendix A2 shows the values of
the Gini index for each country in the six five-year periods. The averages computed for each
period show that income inequality has not declined during the thirty years considered and at
the end of the eighties the average level of the Gini index is higher than at the beginning of the
sixties.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the financial system, the econometric analysis will use
three indexes built by Ross Levine, Norman Loayza and Thorsten Beck (2000) and the data on
the loan-to-value ratio collected by Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano (1994) and Maria
Concetta Chiuri and Tullio Jappelli (2000). The empirical studies that have analyzed the effects
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discussions, see Andrew Atkinson and Andrea Brandolini (1999) and James Galbraith (2002).18
of financial markets’ imperfections have generally used the loan-to-value ratio, since it is a
direct measure of the availability of credit to families. However, loan-to-value data are available
only for twenty countries, with a medium-high level of per capita income; data shortage and
sample selection bias reduce estimates’ reliability
6.
In order to better evaluate the role of credit markets’ efficiency, it is necessary to augment
the sample’s dimension; the three indexes built by Levine, Loayza, Beck (2000) are available
for forty-five out of the sixty three countries in the sample and they seem to capture the main
features of credit markets’ efficiency. The first index measures the proportion of liquid
liabilities on the gross domestic product, as a proxy of the overall dimension of the financial
sector and the degree of diffusion of financial services. The second index considers the ratio of
financial assets hold by the commercial and the central banks, as a measure of the importance of
the commercial banks in the allocation of savings; an increase in the ratio indicates improved
financial efficiency, under the hypothesis that commercial banks are more flexible and better
able to identify opportunities of profitable investments than the central bank. The third index
measures the amount of credit available to the private sector through the financial intermediaries
as a percentage of the gross domestic product; this index directly evaluates the impact of credit
markets’ imperfections on private sector decisions, since it is a direct measure of the amount of
liquidity available in the financial markets.
     4. RESULTS’ INTERPRETATION
The interpretation of the results obtained from the estimation of equation (9) offers a test of
the validity of the gender sensitive theoretical model that has been developed. First of all, the
model predicts a negative impact of income inequality on investment in education and, in
particular, a positive correlation between the Gini index and the educational gender gap; thus,
                                                                                                                                                                 
5 Some examples are Robert Barro (2000), Klaus Deininger and Pedro Olinto (1999)
6 For example, Roberto Perotti (1996) estimates the impact of the loan-to-value ratio on the average schooling rate; he
does not obtain significant estimates.19
the partial derivative of the variable  Gap with respect to the inequality index  Gini,
PERF Gini Gap 4 2 b b + = ¶ ¶ , has to be positive. Moreover, in the presence of more efficient
financial markets, the distribution of income should have a lower impact on investment
decisions. The presence of efficient intermediaries that promote financial flows’ mobility and do
not request high collaterals to the borrowers reduces the importance of the initial income
distribution for future investment decisions; as a consequence, we expect the coefficient of the
variable  INT , the interaction term between Gini index and the variable of credit markets’
perfections, to be negative, that is  0 4 < b . Finally, given an initial resources’ distribution,
higher efficiency of the financial markets increases investment opportunities and thus favors a
reduction of the gender educational gap. The absence of credit constraints and lower borrowing
interest rates decrease the cost of human capital accumulation and promote investment in female
education; as a consequence, the partial derivative of the variable Gap with respect to the index
PERF ,   Gini PERF Gap 4 3 b b + = ¶ ¶ , should be negative.
Table 6 in Appendix A2 presents the results obtained estimating equation (9) with the four
indicators of financial markets’ development. LTV is the loan-to-value ratio, LLY  the amount
liquid liabilities, PRIVO the proportion of credit available to the private sector as a percentage
of the gross domestic product, BTOT the ratio of the financial assets hold by the commercial
banks and the value obtained summing them to the assets hold by the central bank. For each
regression, the table reports the results of fixed or random effects estimation, according to the
result obtained in the Hausman test.
The results offer plain support to the hypothesis of a significant effect of income inequality
on the educational gender gap through credit markets’ imperfections. First of all, there is a
positive correlation between the Gini index and the educational gender gap; in each of the four20
specifications, the index of income inequality has a positive and significant coefficient at the
five per cent level and the partial derivative PERF Gini Gap 4 2 b b + = ¶ ¶ is positive
7.
Secondly, in each regression, the interaction term  INT  has a negative and significant
coefficient at the five per cent level; this result confirms the hypothesis of a decreased
importance of the income distribution, in the presence of more efficient financial markets.
Moreover, the negative sign of the partial derivative  Gini PERF Gap 4 3 b b + = ¶ ¶ confirms the
expectation of a reduced educational gender gap in the presence of more efficient financial
markets
8. As underlined in the theoretical model, in the presence of credit markets’
imperfections, high borrowing interest rates penalize female more than male education. The
econometric results show that the impact of more efficient financial markets depends on the
initial level of income inequality. Since the variable PERF has a positive coefficient, the impact
of improved financial markets on the educational gender gap increases as the Gini index is
higher; in the presence of high-income inequality, financial markets’ reforms could promote a
significant increase in the amount of resources invested in female education. On the contrary,
when income inequality is low, the value of the partial derivative decreases and tends to become
positive. In the presence of low inequality, the importance of credit markets for human capital
accumulation decreases; as underlined in the theoretical model, improvements in the financial
system can be unable to influence investment decisions that are driven by individuals’
preferences and social and cultural factors that favor male education.
The theoretical model has shown the importance of available economic resources to promote
a reduction in the educational gender gap; in particular, the model has underlined the existence
of a critical wealth level below which investment in female education becomes expensive and
unprofitable. As a consequence, we expect a negative correlation between available income and
                                                
7 The results obtained from the specifications that use LTV, LLY, PRIVO, BTOT respectively are the following: 0.0145,
0.0182, 0.0192 and 0.0112. In order to compute the partial derivative, the average value for each variable has been used.
8 The results obtained from the specifications that use LTV, LLY, PRIVO, BTOT respectively are the following: -0.0192,
-0.108, -0.0255, 0.0149. The positive value that is obtained from the regression that uses the variable BTOT has a21
the educational gender gap; the econometric results offer again plain support to this prediction:
in all specifications, the coefficient of the variable lngdppc1 is negative and significant at the
five per cent level, with the only exception of the one that uses the loan-to-value ratio
9.
5. INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: NEW EVIDENCES
5.1 Estimation of the engendered model
In the extensive literature on credit markets’ imperfections
10, different theoretical models
have underlined a negative impact of income inequality on economic growth through the
disincentives to invest in human capital. The estimates reported in table 6 in Appendix A2
support the prediction of a positive correlation between income inequality and the educational
gender gap in the presence of inefficient financial markets, suggesting a negative relationship
between inequality and growth through under investment in female education.
Although different theoretical models describe in details the mechanisms through which
income inequality influences the growth process, empirical analysis have often made use of
reduced form equations, that do not test explicitly the way income disparities impact on growth.
The following econometric model is typically used
11:
it t i it
it it it it o it
BMP
syrf syrm gdppc Gini Growth
e h a d
d d d d d
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
5
4 3 2 1 1 ln
(10)
The growth rate is estimated as a function of the initial level of inequality, income, female
and male human capital, and black market premium, as a proxy for macroeconomic policies and
                                                                                                                                                                 
limited relevance, given the low reliability of this indicator with respect to the other two (see Levine, Loayza, Beck,
2000, pag.9).
9 However, given limited availability and measurement errors that characterize this indicator (see Roberto Perotti,
1994), the obtained result does not modify the main conclusions.
10 See for example Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli and Cecilia García-Peñalosa (1999), Banerjee and Newman (1993) and
Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1997)
11 See for example Roberto Perotti (1996) and Kristin Forbes (2000)22
trade markets distortions. Moreover, in order to improve estimates’ significance and lower the
risk of omitted variable bias, the specification includes individual and period dummy variables.
In this section we use an empirical gender sensitive model that adds to the basic structure
represented by (10) the educational gender gap, as defined in section 3. The following
specification will be tested:
it t i it it
it it it it o it
gap BMP
syrf syrm gdppc Gini Growth
e h a b b
b b b b b
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
6 5
4 3 2 1 1 ln
(11)
where i and t are the individual and period subscript respectively. BMP  is the black market
premium
12; syrf reports the average female secondary schooling years at the beginning of each
of the five years time intervals
13.
An efficient econometric technique that can be used to estimate (11) is fixed and random
effects. However, in order to obtain unbiased estimates, it is necessary to assume the absence of
endogenous variables in the set of independent variables; equation (11) does not satisfy this
assumption, since the logarithm of per capita income can not be taken as exogenous. Rewriting
equation (11) with the growth rate expressed as a difference between income levels and adding
it gdppc1 ln  to both sides of the equation, we obtain:
it t i it it
it it it it o t i
gap BMP
syrf syrm gdppc Gini gdppc
e h a b b
b b g b b
+ + + + +
+ + + + + = +
6 5
4 3 1 1 , 1 ln 1 ln
(11’)
where  1 2 + = b g .
                                                
12 The data source is the Global Development Network Database of the World Bank and the values are the averages for
each of the six time intervals.
13 The data come from Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2000) dataset23
In a synthetic expression we can write:
it t i it it t i y y e h a g + + + B C + = +
'
1 , * (12)
where for simplicity the constant term  o b  has been removed and  N i T t ,....., 1 , ,....., 1 = = . y is
the logarithm of the income level and X represents the vector of the explanatory variables
different from y. Equation (12) specifies a dynamic autoregressive model with individual and
time effects.
We make the following assumptions on the error term:
A1.  ( ) 0 , = t i it y E e
A2.  ( )
2
,
2
e s e = t i it y E
A3.  ( ) , 0 , = t i js it y E e e for any  j i „ ,  t s „
If the number of time intervals does not tend to infinity, even if  ¥ ﬁ N , the estimates
obtained with a fixed or random effects model are biased
14; when T is finite, the probability
limit of the Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator (within) is different from zero. Since in
our analysis  t=6, the estimates obtained with a fixed or random effects estimator are
inconsistent.
Under the same set of assumptions A1-A3 on the error term, Manuel Arellano and Stephen
Bond (1991) have developed the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that
delivers unbiased results in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables. In order to
eliminate the influence of the individual effects, the GMM estimator considers each variable in24
first differences and it uses the lags of each variable as instruments. Equation (12) can be
rewritten as follows:
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ,
'
1 ,
'
1 , 1 , - - - + - + B C - C + - = - t i it t i it t i it it t i y y y y e e g (13)
where all variables are expressed in deviation from each period average. For the third period,
1 , i y  is an instrument for( ) 1 , 2 , i i y y - , since it is correlated with  ( ) 1 , 2 , i i y y -
and ( ) [ ] 0 2 3 1 , = - i i i y E e e . In the fourth period,  1 , i y  and  2 , i y  are the instruments for( ) 2 , 3 , i i y y - ; in
each period this procedure delivers the instruments for each of the variables expressed in first
differences. As a consequence, the number of instruments grows with time and in the last
period, T, there will be  ( ) 2 , 2 1 ..., , , - T i i i y y y  instrumental variables. For any individual i, we can
define the following instruments’ matrix:
   
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
=
-2 , 3 2 1
3 2 1
2 1
1
. . 0 0 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 0 0 0
0 . . . . . 0 0 0 0
0 . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0
T i i i i
i i i
i i
i
i
y y y y
y y y
y y
y
W
If the panel is unbalanced, GMM estimator is computed deleting the rows of the  i W  matrix
with no observations and replacing with a zero the missing values in the included columns. The
variation of the number of observations and time intervals among different individuals does not
weaken the obtained estimates, under the assumption that the observations are independently
                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Ruth Judson and Anne Owen (1996) report that the use of fixed effects when t=5 produces a bias greater than fifty
percent for the lagged dependent variable and a bias of approximately three percent for the other coefficients (see
Kristin Forbes 2000, page 876).25
and randomly distributed
15. Finally, if we assume that the explanatory variables are exogenous,
the vector of variables  it x D  provides other instruments for the estimation of equation (13); in
this case, the matrix i W  will have one more row, made of the vector of exogenous explanatory
variables expressed in first differences.
The estimates obtained with GMM estimator are efficient if the variables in first differences
in the vector  s t i - C ,  are predetermined of at least one period, that is if  ( ) 0
' = C is itu E  for any t s > .
Moreover, the errors have to be serially uncorrelated, that is  ( ) 0 , , = -s t i t i E e e  for any 1 ‡ s ; the
test statistic for second order serial correlation from the first-step estimates can be used to check
for this assumption
16.
Table 7 in Appendix A2 presents the estimates obtained for equation (11) with fixed effects,
random effects and GMM estimator. The results differ significantly according to the estimation
technique that has been used. A Hausman specification test rejects the assumption of no
correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables
17; random effects lead to biased
estimates, fixed effects have to be chosen. However, the presence of the endogenous variable
lngdppc1 violates the fundamental assumption of exogenous explanatory variables that is
necessary for the use of both fixed and random effects techniques. As already underlined, GMM
estimation offers a possible solution to this problem, delivering consistent estimates even in the
presence of endogenous regressors; a serial correlation test confirms the absence of serial
correlation in the error terms, as requested for estimates’ efficiency
18.
The coefficients in column (3) confirm the results obtained in the most recent analysis of the
relationship between income inequality and economic growth
19. As predicted by the models of
conditional convergence, the coefficient of the initial level of income is negative and significant;
                                                
15 For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Arellano and Bond (1991)
16 For the coefficient estimates, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend the use of the first-step results, due to the
underestimation of the second-step standard errors.
17 The P-value of the test statistic is 0.0000; thus, the null hypothesis is rejected at any significance level.
18 The P-value of the test statistic in the second order serial correlation test is 0.8963; thus, the null hypothesis of
absence of second order serial correlation can not be rejected at any standard significance level.26
the sign of the correlation between growth rate and black market premium, female and male
education coincides with the one estimated in the literature, even if the coefficients of these
three variables are not significant. The results obtained with GMM estimator confirm the
importance of including the gender educational gap in the set of regressors; the variable gap has
a negative sign and is significant at the ninety-nine percent level. Finally, confirming a result
obtained by different authors that have performed GMM estimation
20, Gini index is positively
correlated with economic growth. A positive relationship between income inequality and growth
may seem difficult to justify and counterintuitive. However, the results obtained with panel
estimations on five years time intervals capture the short run effect of income inequality on the
growth process; a positive relationship in the short run does not rule out the existence of a
negative correlation in the long run.
In conclusion, the estimates show the complexity of the relationship between inequality and
growth that is influenced by different factors with opposite influence. In particular, the positive
direct impact of the Gini index has to be discounted by the indirect growth reducing effect due
to the increase of the gender educational gap; therefore, it is necessary to further analyse the
impact of inequality on growth, comparing the gender-sensitive model and the gender-neutral
one.
5.2 Engendered and gender-neutral model: a comparison
The theoretical model developed in section 2 and the estimates obtained in section 3 suggest
the existence of a relationship between income inequality and economic growth through the
impact of income disparities on the gender educational gap, in the presence of credit markets’
imperfections. In order to evaluate the net effect of inequality on growth, we can use equation
(9) and (11) to estimate a two-equation model, as follows:
                                                                                                                                                                 
19 See Forbes (2000).27
it t i it it
it it it it o it
gap BMP
syrf syrm gdppc Gini Growth
e h a b b
b b b b b
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
6 5
4 3 2 1 1 ln
it i it it it it o it e INT PERF Gini gdppc Gap + + + + + + = a g g g g g 4 3 2 1 1 ln (14)
As already underlined, the relationship between inequality and growth has been traditionally
analysed with a gender-neutral equation as (10) above. This approach has two serious pitfalls;
first of all, it does not include among the explanatory variables the significant variable gap.
Secondly, it does estimate a reduced form model that does not investigate the mechanism
through which income inequality impacts on growth.
Given the statistical significance of   3 6,g b and  4 g , a model that excludes gap delivers
biased estimates; in particular, given the positive correlation between income inequality and
gender gap, the omission of the variable gap should result in an underestimation of the impact
of Gini index on the dependent variable. In order to measure the bias of the gender-neutral
model, we compare the results obtained from the estimated impact of the Gini index in equation
(10) and in the two-equation system (14); thus, we compare  1 d  of the variable  Gini from
equation (10) with the partial derivative of the growth rate with respect to the inequality index in
equation (14)  ( ) PERF Gini Crescita 4 2 6 1 * g g b b + + = ¶ ¶
21. In the previous section, we have
underlined the arguments that justify the choice of the GMM estimator; in what follows we omit
the estimates from fixed and random effects models. Table 8 in Appendix A2 reports the
coefficients estimated with the GMM estimator applied to equation (10) and to the first equation
of system (14).
                                                                                                                                                                 
20 See for example Abhijit Benerjee, Esther Duflo (2000), Kristin Forbes (2000), Hongyi Li, Hengfu Zou (1998)
21 For the computation of the partial derivatives the average value of LTV, LLY, PRIVO and
   BTOT has been used.28
Table 9 in Appendix A2 presents the computation of the partial derivatives of the growth
rate with respect to the Gini index in the engendered model, considering each of the four
indexes of financial markets’ development included in the dataset. The results confirm the
importance of including the gender educational gap in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of
the impact of income inequality on economic growth; a comparison between the values reported
in the second and in the third column of table 8 shows the distortion of the coefficients
estimated in the gender neutral specification. The inclusion of the gender educational gap
significantly modifies the impact of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable; in
particular, the estimated impact of the Gini index changes from 0.0069 to 0.0084, confirming
the expected downward bias when the educational gap is not included in the set of regressors.
The computations in table 9 offers a robustness’ check of the estimates obtained with the
gender-neutral model; the results show that the net impact of income inequality on growth
estimated from system (14) tends to coincides with the impact estimated from equation (10).
Since the partial derivatives have been computed with the average value of the credit perfections
variables, a gender neutral equation as (10) seems to estimate correctly the impact of income
inequality on growth only if the financial markets efficiency’s indexes do not significantly vary
from the average level; moreover, even if equation (10) delivers a correct estimate of the
average impact of inequality on growth, it does not investigate  the mechanism through which
income disparities influence the growth process.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
An empirical analysis of the relationship between income inequality and economic growth
with the GMM estimator has been recently proposed by Kristin Forbes (2000) that has
considered a gender-neutral reduced form model as the one given by equation (10). Forbes uses
a sample of forty-five countries with observations for the Gini index for at least two consecutive29
time intervals. In this section, we use Forbes’ sample for a sensitivity analysis of the results
obtained with the estimation of the engendered model
22.
Table 10 in Appendix A2 contains the results obtained from the estimation of equation (9)
with the four indexes of financial markets’ development. As in table 6, the estimates confirm the
hypothesis of a significant effect of income inequality on the educational gender gap through the
inefficiencies of financial markets. In all four specifications, the Gini index has a positive and
significant coefficient and the partial derivative  PERF Gini Gap 4 2 b b + = ¶ ¶  has a positive
sign
23. In all the regressions, the interaction term INT has a negative and significant coefficient;
the expectation of a negative sign of the partial derivative  Gini PERF Gap 4 3 b b + = ¶ ¶  is
confirmed in two cases over four
24. Finally, the estimates support the expectation of a negative
coefficient of per capita income; as predicted in the theoretical model, an increase in the
available economic resources leads to a reduction of the gender educational gap.
The first column of table 11 in Appendix A2 presents the estimates obtained with the
gender-neutral model used by Forbes
25. The sign of the coefficients is the same as the one
reported by the author; however, black market premium, female and male education are not
significant, confirming the results obtained in the sample with sixty-three countries. The
comparison with the results obtained from the gender-sensitive model shows once again the
significance of the gender gap variable. Considering the positive correlation between Gini and
Gap, the omission of the gender gap produces an underestimation of the impact of income
                                                
22 The only difference with respect to the sample used by Forbes is the exclusion of Bulgaria, since this country is not
included in the Barro-Lee dataset.
23 Considering LTV, LLY, PRIVO and BTOT, the obtained results are respectively: 0,0145, 0,003, 0,003,
-0,318. The negative value from the regression that includes BTOT does not modify the main conclusions, due to the
low reliability of this indicator with respect to the other two (see Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000).
24 Considering LTV and BTOT, the obtained results are respectively: -0,018, -0,007; using LLY and PRIVO, the results
are respectively 0,16 and 0,23.
25 As indicator of macroeconomic policies distortions, Forbes uses PPPI, the investment price level; however, in the
sensitivity analysis she shows how the black market premium is an alternative indicator that does not modify the
conclusions of her analysis.30
inequality on the growth rate; in the gender neutral specification the coefficient of the Gini
index is lower than in the engendered model.
In order to evaluate the bias of the estimates when the gap variable is not included in the
regression, table 12 in Appendix A2 presents the computation of the total effect of the Gini
index on the dependent variable in system (14). Confirming the results obtained with the sample
of sixty-three countries, the values reported in the fourth column, obtained with the average
value of the financial efficiency’s indicators, tend to coincide with the estimates of the Gini
variable coefficient in equation (10); the gender-neutral specification correctly evaluates the
impact of inequality on growth, when the financial efficiency’s indexes do not encounter great
variations.
The empirical analysis that has been developed underlines the importance of including the
educational gender gap in order to obtain unbiased estimates. The results with the sixty-three
and forty-four countries sample confirm the hypothesis of a relationship between income
inequality and economic growth through a gender biased impact of credit markets imperfections
on human capital accumulation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The diffusion of poverty feminization and the preference toward male education have
motivated a theoretical and empirical analysis in order to investigate the factors that lead to
under invest in female schooling; this paper has developed a model of the relationship of
income inequality and the educational gender gap in the presence of liquidity constraints and
inefficient financial markets. In cultural contexts where male education is considered more
profitable, inefficient financial markets have a gender biased impact on human capital
accumulation; given the significant positive effects of women’s education on economic growth,
the results show the negative impact of income inequality through the disincentives to invest in
female schooling.31
The literature that has analysed investment in human capital and the relationship between
inequality and growth has traditionally adopted a gender-neutral approach, considering the
impact of resources’ availability on an average measure of educational attainment. Given the
significant spillover effects of female education and the persistent gender differences in
enrolment and attendance rates at each schooling level, this approach is unsatisfactory; it is
necessary to evaluate the impact of income disparities on the gender gap in education and not on
the mean educational level.
The gender-sensitive analysis developed in this paper suggests a new explanation of the
relationship between inequality and growth, through the impact of credit markets’ imperfections
on the educational gender gap. The empirical results offer strong support to the predictions of
the theoretical model; the main findings can be summarised as follows:
1.  Income inequality, measured with the Gini index, has a positive impact on the educational
gender gap, defined as the ratio of male to female secondary schooling; an increase in
income inequality leads to under invest in female with respect to male education.
2.  Financial market efficiency has a negative impact on the educational gender gap; in the
presence of liquidity constraints, high borrowing interest rates penalise female more than
male education. More efficient financial intermediaries can promote women’s education
through a reduction of the costs of financing human capital accumulation.
3.  The econometric results suggest the existence of a negative relationship between inequality
and growth through the disincentives to invest in female education; a financial markets’
reform to improve efficiency and increase available liquidity could offer an important
contribution to the closure of the gender educational gap and to economic growth prospects
through this channel.32
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Appendix A1
VARIABLES’ DESCRIPTION
Growth: growth rate of PPP-adjusted per capita gross domestic product.  Source: Global
Development Network Growth Database 2000.
lgdppc1: logarithm of PPP-adjusted per capita gross domestic product.  Source: Global
Development Network Growth Database 2000.
Gap: educational gender gap as a ratio of average male and female secondary school years.
Source: Barro and Lee, 2000.
Syrm: average male secondary school years. Source: Barro and Lee, 2000.
Syrf: average female secondary school years. Source: Barro and Lee, 2000.
Gini: Gini index of income inequality. Source: Deininger and Squire, 1996.
Ltv: loan-to-value ratio, index of access to credit; it considers the collaterals required to obtain a
loan for buying a house. Source: Jappelli and Pagano, 1994 and Chiuri and Jappelli, 2000.
Lly: liquid liabilities as a proportion of gross domestic product. Liquid liabilities are the sum of
money, deposits and financial assets. Source: Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1999.
Privo: credit given to the private sector by financial intermediaries as a proportion of gross
domestic product. Source: Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1999.
Btot: ratio of commercial banks’ financial assets and the value obtained summing them with
Central Bank’s financial assets. Source: Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1999.
Bmp: black market premium, computed with the formula: [(black market exchange rate)/(official
exchange rate-1)]*100. Source: Global Development Network Growth Database, 2000.
Int: interaction term between Gini index and financial markets efficiency’s indicators.
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable           Obs           Media         Std. Dev.           Min              Max
growth        463    .1002504   .1483518  -.4362797   .7136038
 lgdppc1      466    7.978451   .9450831   5.857933   9.801123
     gap      461    2.146746   2.368982   .4742404       39.5
    syrm      462    1.307998   1.073378        .03      5.374
    syrf      463    1.010186   1.031485       .002      5.106
    gini      264    39.99875   9.252704         21       61.9
     ltv       92    73.73913   12.33495         50         95
     lly      356    .4191604   .2420613    .064407   1.914396
   privo      355    .3944883   .3195163   .0090594   2.059511
    btot      360     .782754   .1866154   .1792692          1
     bmp      440    52.53732   202.5083      -9.93    2792.3636
Appendix A2
                         Illiteracy rate for the population
               aged 15 years and above                                                             Table 1
Regions 1980 2000
Women Men Women Men
Africa
Northern Africa 74 43 48 25
Southern Africa 33 35 16 21
Rest of Africa Sub-Sahara 73 51 51 33
Latin America
and Caribbean
Central America 31 26 22 18
South America 18 12 9 6
Asia
East and Southeast Asia 27 12 12 5
South of Asia 65 44 50 30
West of Asia 48 27 25 13
Developed regions 8 4 3 1
                            Source: Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database (Wistat), Version 4, CDROM
 Illiteracy rate for the population
                           aged 15 – 24 in the 1990s                                                              Table 2
F M F M
Africa Africa (continued)
Algeria 38 14 Senegal 72 51
Benin 73 45 Sudan 41 22
Burundi 52 40 Tunisia 28 7
Cameroon 29 15 Uganda 37 23
Central Africa Rep. 65 37 Zambia 28 20
Cotè d'Avoire 62 40
Djibouti 52 38 Latin America
Egypt 49 29 Guatemala 29 18
Malawi 51 30
Mali 81 62 Asia
Mauritania 62 43 Nepal 67 32
Morocco 54 29 Yemen 64 17
Niger 90 75
                                  Source: Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database (Wistat), Version 4, CDROM37
                      Combined primary/secondary gross enrolment ratios, 1994/1996      Table 3
F M F M
North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Morocco 54 71 (continued)
Senegal 37 48
Sub-Saharan Africa Sierra Leone 29 43
Benin 35 63 Somalia 8 16
Burkina Faso 16 26 Togo 59 92
Central Africa Rep. 26 43
Chad 23 47 South-East Asia
Cotè d'Avoire 38 58 Cambodia 68 86
Congo Rep. 41 62 Laos Rep. 63 80
Djibouti 22 31
Ethiopia 20 33 South Asia
Gambia 46 62 Afghanistan 22 49
Ghana 50 64 Bangladesh 38 49
Guinea 20 41 India 62 81
Guinea-Bissau 27 50 Nepal 53 94
Mali 20 33 Pakistan 26 53
Mauritania 42 54
Mozambique 27 38 West Asia
Niger 14 23 Iraq 58 73
Nigeria 61 77 Yemen 34 90
                            Source: Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database (Wistat), Version 4, CD-ROM
         Female over male enrolment rate                                                                                   Table 4
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
World Age >= 25 years 86,4 83,9 83,6 83,1 84,3
(107 Countries) Age >= 15 years 86,7 84,7 84,3 85,5 85,4
Developing Age >= 25 years 48,5 49,7 55,9 63,1 67,4
Countries Age >= 15 years 55,7 57,2 62,5 69,3 71,8
East and North Age >= 25 years 51,3 43,9 49,7 56,9 63,1
Africa Age >= 15 years 51 50,5 58 69,1 73,3
Sub-Saharan Age >= 25 years 59,3 55,4 54 62,6 66,9
Africa Age >= 15 years 61,8 60,1 66 65 70,8
Latin America Age >= 25 years 82,9 78,9 89,5 93,6 95,1
and Caribbean Age >= 15 years 96,3 85 93,7 96,8 94,4
East Asia Age>= 25 years 49 57,2 67,9 76,1 80,3
and Pacific Age >= 15 years 58,8 67,5 76,1 83,7 85,6
South Asia Age >= 25 years 25,3 29,2 35 44 49
Age >= 15 years 31,4 36,8 41,9 51,9 55,4
Developed Countries Age >= 25 years 93,3 92,3 93,5 91,3 93,7
Age >= 15 years 94,7 93,9 95,2 96,1 95
Transition Countries Age >= 25 years 85,9 88,6 89,2 92,2 100,9
Age >= 15 years 88,2 90,6 90,7 94 105,1
            Source: Barro, Lee (2000), “International Data on Educational Attainment. Updates and Implications” NBER W.P. 79138
   Gini Index                                                                                                               Table 5
Country    1960-64   1965-69   1970-74   1975-79   1980-84   1985-89
Australia . 32 . 39,3 37,6      41,7
Bangladesh 37,3 34,2 36 35,2 36 35,5
Barbados . 36,9 . 48,9 . .
Belgium . . . 28,3 26,2 26,6
Bolivia . 49,6 .         . . 42,04
Brazil . 57,6 61,9 57,8 61,8 59,6
Canada 31,6 32,3 31,6 31 32,8 27,6
Chile . 45,6 46 53,2 . 55,9
China          .         . . 32 31,4 34,6
Colombia . 52 46 54,5 . 51,2
Korea        34,3 33,3 36 38,6 34,5 33,6
Costa Rica          . . 44,4 45 47 46,1
Denmark . . . 31 31 33,2
Dominique Rep. . . . 45 43,3 50,5
Egypt         40         . 38 . . .
El Salvador 53 46,5 . 48,4 . .
Fiji . 46 . 42,5 . .
Philippine 49,7 51,3 49,4 . 46,1 45,7
Finland . 31,8 27 30,9 30,8 26,2
France 47 44 43 34,9 34,9 .
Germany 28,13 33,57 30,62 32,06 32,2 26
Japan 34,8 35,5 34,4 33,4 35,9 35
Jordan . . . 40,8 . 36,1
Greece . . 41,7 . 39,9 41,8
Guatemala          . . . 49,7 . 59,06
Honduras . 61,9 . . . 54
Hong Kong          .         . 39,8 37,3 45,2 42
India 37,7 37 35,8 38,7 38,1 36,3
Indonesia 40 37,3 . 42,2 39 39,7
Iran . 45,4 42,3 . 42,9 .
Ireland . . 38,7 35,7 . 34,6
Italy . . 39 34,3 33,2 2,7
Jamaica . . 44,5 . . 41,8
Kenya        48,8 . . 59 57,3 .
Malaise . 50 51,8 51 48 48,4
Mauritius . . . 45,7 . 39,6
Mexico 55,5 57,7 57,9 50 50,6 55
Nepal .          . . . 53 30,06
New Zealand . . 30 34,8      35,8 40,2
Norway 37,5 36 37,5 31,2 31,4 33,1
Holland          . . 28,6 28,1 29,1 29,6
Pakistan . 36,5 38,1 38,9 39 38
Panama . 57 . 47,5 . 56,5
Peru . . 55 . 49,3 49,4
Poland . . . 25 25,3 26,239
Portugal . . 40,6 36,8 . 35,8
United Kingdom 24,3 25,1 23,3 24,9 27,1 32,3
Senegal . 50,15 43 . . .
Singapore          . . 41 40,7 42 39
Spain 32 . 37,1 33,4 31,8 32,5
Sri Lanka 47 37,7 35,3 42 45,3 36,7
United States 34,6 34,1 34,4 35,2 37,3 37,8
Sweden . 33,4 27,3 32,4 31,2 32,5
Thailand 41,3 42,6 41,7 . 43,1 48,8
Taiwan 32,2 29,4 31,2 28 29,2 30,1
Trinidad e
Tobago
. . 51 46,1 41,7        .
Tunisia 49 . 50,6 49,6 49,6 46,8
Turkey          . 56 51 . . 44
Uganda . 40,07 . . . 33
Hungary 25,9 22,9 22,8 21,5 21 23,3
Venezuela . . 47,7 39,4 42,8 53,8
Yugoslavia 31,18 . 32 34,73 32,4 31,88
Zambia . . 59 51 . .
Average 38,85 41,66 40,38 39,54 38,5 39,79
               Source: Deininger and Squire (1996)40
                                                                                                  Table 6
Financial
efficiency
indicators
LTV^ LLY PRIVO BTOT^
         lgdppc1 -0,0967          -0,8287***    -0,6851***   -0,6805***
(0,994)           (0,195) (0,209)         (0,119)
            Gini     0,1261***           0,0489***    0,0449***   0,127***
(0,027)           (0,017) (0,012) (0,027)
           PERF     0,0409***           2,5959*     2,2819***   5,691***
(0,013) (1,399) (0,831) (1,564)
           INT     -0,0015***  -0,0682*     -0,0582***   -0,143***
(0,000) (0,035) (0,021) (0,033)
        constant -1,3564     6,6694***     5,5546***    2,2462**
(1,331)           (1,690) (1,806) (1,327)
        R-squared 0,71             0,22 0,20 0,23
       # countries 63              63             63             63
          Period 1965-1994       1965-1994 1965-1994 1965-1994
      Notes: Dependent variable is the educational gender gap, computed as the ratio between
      male and female schooling. Standard errors are in parenthesis; R-squared is R-squared within
      for the fixed effects model, R-squared overall for the random effects one.
      ^estimates obtained with the random effects model
       *significance level of 90%, **of 95%, ***of 99%
                                       Table 7
          Estimation
          technique
Fixed Effects
(1)
   Random Effects
             (2)
Arellano
and Bond
(3)
            Gini     0,0067***           -0,0008     0,0084***
(0,002)           (0,001) (0,003)
         lgdppc1     -0,2473***           -0,0487**    -0,4916***
(0,047)           (0,019) (0,073)
           syrm 0,0027           0,0216 -0,00004
(0,037) (0,026) (0,047)
            syrf 0,031 -0,0011 0,0306
(0,039) (0,028) (0,047)
           BMP     -0,0001***   -0,0001** -0,0002
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
            gap     -0,022***     -0,0191***    -0,0408***
(0,009) (0,006) (0,016)
        constant     1,855***            0,5845*** 0,0208
(0,000)           (0,171) (0,015)
       # countries 63              63             63
          Period 1965-1994        1965-1994 1965-1994
                   Notes: Dependent variable is yearly average growth. Standard errors
      are in parenthesis. R-squared is R-squared within for fixed effects model,
      R-squared overall for the random effects one.
                   *significance level of 90%, **of 95%, ***of 99%41
                   
                  Table 8
        Estimated
          Model
Reduced form
gender-neutral
             (1)
   Reduced form
gender-sensitive
             (2)
            Gini     0,0069***     0,0084***
(0,003) (0,003)
         lgdppc1     -0,5266***    -0,4916***
(0,072) (0,073)
           syrm -0,024 -0,00004
(0,048) (0,047)
            syrf 0,0453 0,0306
(0,049) (0,047)
           BMP -0,0002 -0,0002
(0,000) (0,000)
            gap    -0,0408***
(0,016)
        constant     0,0363*** 0,0208
(0,013) (0,015)
        # countries 63              63
          Period 1965-1994        1965-1994
                                     Notes: Dependent variable is yearly average growth.
                 Standard errors are in parenthesis. R-squared is
           R-squared within for fixed effects model,
 R-squared overall for the random effects one.
                     *significance level of 90%, **of 95%, ***of 99%
                                                                Table 9
Impact of Gini
Index on the
growth rate
Direct impact
         (a)
 Indirect impact
           (b)
Total impact
      (a+b)
           LTV 0,0084    (-0,0408*0,0155) 0,0077
           LLY 0,0084    (-0,0408*0,0202) 0,0075
         PRIVO 0,0084     (-0,0408*0,022) 0,0075
         BTOT 0,0084    (-0,0408*0,0113) 0,0079
                     Notes: The values in column (a) report the Gini coefficient obtained from model
        (2) in table 3. The indirect impact is computed by multiplying the coefficient of the
        educational gender gap variable from table 3 with the partial derivative of the
        gender gap with respect to the Gini index computed from equation 9.42
            Table 10
Financial
efficiency
indicators LTV^ LLY PRIVO BTOT^
         lgdppc1 -0,0967          -0,9996***    -0,9015***   -0,5273**
(0,994)           (0,188) (0,198)         (0,213)
            Gini     0,1261***            0,0354*   0,0266*     0,1102***
(0,027)           (0,020) (0,014) (0,029)
           PERF     0,0409***           2,7204*     2,0555***    4,1585***
(0,013) (1,413) (0,789) (1,562)
           INT     -0,0015***  -0,0661*    -0,0471**   -0,119***
(0,000) (0,037) (0,020) (0,033)
        constant -1,3564     8,5831***     8,028*** 1,9913
(1,331)           (1,749) (1,791) (2,097)
        R-squared 0,71             0,22 0,20 0,36
       # countries 44              44             44             44
          Period 1965-1994       1965-1994 1965-1994 1965-1994
      Notes: Dependent variable is the educational gender gap, computed as the ratio between
      male and female schooling. Standard errors are in parenthesis; R-squared is R-squared within
      for the fixed effects model, R-squared overall for the random effects one.
      ^estimates obtained with the random effects model
       *significance level of 90%, **of 95%, ***of 99%
                                                                 Table 11
        Estimated
          Model
Reduced form
gender-neutral
             (1)
   Reduced form
gender-sensitive
             (2)
            Gini     0,0084***     0,0089***
(0,003) (0,003)
         lgdppc1    -0,45***    -0,4076***
(0,067) (0,068)
           syrm -0,012 -0,0018
(0,045) (0,044)
            syrf 0,0378 0,0294
(0,045) (0,044)
           BMP -0,0001 -0,0002
(0,000) (0,000)
            gap   -0,035**
(0,016)
        constant    0,031** 0,0155
(0,012) (0,014)
        # countries 44              44
          Period 1965-1994        1965-1994
                                    Notes: Dependent variable is yearly average growth. Standard
              errors are in parenthesis. R-squared is R-squared within for the
             fixed effects model, R-squared overall for the random effects one.
                    *significance level of 90%, **of 95%, ***of 99%43
                   
                Table 12
Impact of Gini
index on the
growth rate
Direct impact
         (a)
 Indirect impact
           (b)
Total impact
      (a+b)
          LTV 0,0089    (-0,035*0,0145) 0,0084
         LLY 0,0089    (-0,035*0,003) 0,0083
         PRIVO 0,0089    (-0,035*0,0026) 0,0083
         BTOT 0,0089    (-0,035*-0,0068) 0,009
                 Notes: The values in column (a) report the Gini coefficient obtained from model (2)
        in table 3. The indirect impact is computed by multiplying the coefficient of the
        educational gender gap variable from table 3 with the partial derivative of the
        gender gap with respect to the Gini index computed from equation 9.